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 Introduction
I agree with the two key premises of Floris de Witte’s ‘kick off’: namely, 
that 1) freedom of movement lies at the core of EU citizenship and is worth 
defending as such, and 2) that many of the attacks on it are at best misin-
formed, misguided and mistaken, at worst malign, mendacious, and moti-
vated by prejudice and xenophobia.
However, I disagree with much of what he says in support of these posi-
tions. I think he confuses the moral case for some form of cosmopolitanism 
and the empirical reinforcement this gets in an interdependent world, on the 
one hand, with an argument for a fully fledged political and legal cosmopoli-
tanism that looks to the ultimate demise of nation states as a necessary con-
dition for justice, on the other. The first may offer normative and empirical 
support for a supranational Union of states along the lines of the EU, in 
which there is a status such as Union citizenship that offers free movement 
between the component polities. However, that need not imply a version of 
the second involving a teleological account of the EU’s development, such 
as de Witte offers, whereby individuals must cease to be members of nation 
states; democracy becomes in some way constrained by, or even substitut-
able by, a given conception of justice; and we need no longer conceive our-
selves as members of a community of fate. What I want to suggest in this 
comment is that one can accept a broadly cosmopolitan moral and empirical 
case for free movement within the EU as both normatively compelling and 
of practical benefit, while disputing all three of his arguments for this posi-
tion and maintaining the very statist perspective on each of the three issues 
that he seeks to challenge.
Let me start by briefly setting out (space constraints mean I cannot here 
defend, though I have attempted to do so elsewhere1) what might be called 
1 Among other pieces, see Bellamy, R. (2013), ‘An Ever Closer Union of 
Peoples: Republican Intergovernmentalism, Demoi-cracy and Representation 
in the EU’, Journal of European Integration 35 (5): 499–516; (2015), 
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a cosmopolitan statist perspective on the EU. I shall then deploy this per-
spective to comment on Floris de Witte’s three arguments, noting in each 
case how free movement can be defended while stopping short of the view 
he advocates.
 Cosmopolitan statism, EU citizenship and freedom 
of movement
On the account I adopt, the most normatively appealing and empirically 
plausible way of conceiving the EU is as a republic of democratic nation 
states. The argument is broadly Kantian, tweaked to accommodate contem-
porary concerns and conditions. It is both statist and cosmopolitan, and ori-
entated around the value of non-domination. It is statist in arguing that to 
institute justice among individuals who reasonably disagree about its nature 
and application requires the establishment of a sovereign authority to gov-
ern the relations of those who share a social space. Yet if that authority is to 
be non-dominating and not itself a source of injustice, it must be under the 
equal influence and control of those to whom it applies. Therefore, justice 
implies the establishment of both a state and a democratic regime within it. 
Just relations can only pertain among citizens. However, in an intercon-
nected world it becomes possible not only for states and their citizens to 
dominate other states and their citizens, both directly and indirectly, but also 
for various non-state agents and agencies, such as corporations and terrorist 
groups, to do so. That possibility increases when not all states operate demo-
cratically, with such non-democratic states not only dominating their own 
citizens, but also more likely to seek to dominate the citizens of other states 
too and to provide a haven for non-state agents and agencies to do so as well. 
Meanwhile, citizens of all states have various reasons to move freely 
between states– some to escape dominating or failing regimes, others to 
trade, find employment and for leisure, among other motives. As a result, 
states have good cause to cooperate and establish supranational legal and 
political structures to prevent their mutual domination, help them support 
non-dominating regimes in states where they do not as yet exist or are under 
threat, tackle domination from other non-state sources, and to facilitate 
the free movement of citizens between these states in ways that avoid 
‘Between Cosmopolis and Community: Justice and Legitimacy in A European 
Union of Peoples’, in S. Tierney (ed.), Nationalism and Globalisation: New 
Settings, New Challenges, 207–232. Oxford: Hart; and (2016) (with 
S. Kröger), ‘Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of National 
Parliaments in Domesticating and Normalising the Politicization of European 
Integration’, Comparative European Politics 14 (2): 131–153.
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discrimination or domination, either of or by them. My claim is that the EU 
can be regarded as the closest we have to such a republican system of states 
at present.
Of course, I am not suggesting either that the EU perfectly meets the 
criteria of such a structure or that all the actors involved by any means con-
ceive it in these terms.2 I merely contend that it is a plausible way of con-
ceiving it and one that has normative appeal as a guide to how it should and 
could develop. On this view, a commitment to the role of democratic states 
as offering a context for non-dominating relations among citizens requires 
as a matter of consistency that states act towards other states and their citi-
zens on the basis of certain cosmopolitan norms, not least through establish-
ing structures such as the Council of Europe and the EU that seek to reduce 
non-domination between, within and across states in the various ways men-
tioned above. In this regard, the current support of certain Conservative 
politicians in Britain for Brexit and/or withdrawal from the ECHR must be 
regarded as either incoherent – at odds with their professed desire to defend 
the very idea of democratic statehood, or insincere – either done for political 
advantage or because they are not that attached to democracy in the first 
place.
I make these points to indicate how one can be opposed to the populist 
nationalist rhetoric of those critical of the very idea of the EU and of free 
movement within it, without necessarily being opposed to the idea of demo-
cratic statehood. On the contrary, one can regard the EU as existing to sup-
port democratic statehood in a variety of ways rather than as supplanting 
and substituting for it. From this perspective, the linkage of Union citizen-
ship to member state citizenship is not a transitionary feature destined to 
whither away but inherent to its very nature. Its purpose is not to supplant 
but to supplement member state citizenship in two main ways: first, it allows 
free movement between states in ways that involve showing equal concern 
and respect to the citizenship regimes of both the host state and that state of 
origin; second, it gives citizens a direct say in the supranational structures to 
ensure they show them equal concern and respect as citizens of distinct 
member states. As we shall see, this is very different to the characterisation 
that Floris de Witte offers.
2 For a critique of current EU economic and monetary policies from this 
perspective, see Bellamy, R. & A. Weale (2015), ‘Political Legitimacy and 
European Monetary Union: Contracts, Constitutionalism and the Normative 
Logic of Two-Level Games’, Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 
257–274.
State Citizenship, EU Citizenship and Freedom of Movement
110
 De Witte’s three arguments
De Witte’s first argument favouring free movement is that it emancipates the 
individual from the nation state. He offers rather different instances of this 
emancipation. One of his examples, that of an LGBT couple denied recogni-
tion in their country of birth, concerns a denial of human rights within a 
given state. The others, such as the retired teacher from Middlesbrough 
seeking to enjoy her pension in Lanzarote, relate to various personal choices 
that will be facilitated through freedom of movement between states, some 
involving more significant interests than others. He claims that emphasis on 
nationality only provides public recognition to individuals on the basis of a 
single dimension that ignores or even suppresses the other dimensions of 
people’s lives – as he puts it, in a statement I find extraordinary, ‘the nation 
state’s mode of social integration reduces the incredibly complex individual 
to a one-dimensional being.’ This hyperbole grossly mischaracterises the 
role of nationality within the public cultures of the member states, all of 
which are constitutional democracies. It is not as if the retired teacher is 
obliged by UK law to only spend her pension on holidaying in an approved 
British seaside resort with suitably grey weather and wearing a hat display-
ing the Union Jack. The legal systems of most member states uphold rights 
to as diverse a range of life style choices as are to be found across the EU, 
even if all states fall short in certain respects, some more egregiously than 
others. Yet all these rights require a political infrastructure to determine and 
enforce them. This infrastructure involves citizens of any polity in a com-
plex set of mutual obligations, that in the case of securing many rights – 
such as pensions – require a degree of solidarity among them. Emancipation 
from these sorts of bonds constitutes a form of free-riding that is ultimately 
self-defeating for all but a privileged few. For these very bonds make the 
rights individuals claim possible in the first place.3 The retired teacher would 
not wish to go to Lanzarote if such an infrastructure was not in place that 
ensured a system of property rights sufficient to allow her holiday home to 
be built and uphold her civil rights to personal security once there, and 
would not have a pension enabling her to do so in the first place if she had 
not worked under a similar regime in the UK. Any system of free move-
ment, therefore, has to be such that it respects and upholds the two systems 
of citizenship rights that make her movement from one to the other possible 
in the first place.
3 I have criticised a somewhat similar argument to de Witte’s by Dimitry 
Kochenov in Bellamy, R. (2015), ‘A Duty Free Europe? What’s Wrong with 
Kochenov’s Account of EU Citizenship Rights’, European Law Review 21 (4): 
558–565.
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His second argument for free movement, as a recalibration of justice and 
democracy, is in this respect more nuanced in that it appears, initially at 
least, to recognize that there is a need for reciprocity both between citizen-
ship regimes and among those who participate within any one of them. As it 
happens, I agree with him that there is no evidence that the UK would be 
justified in applying an ‘emergency brake’. But none of what he says here 
seems to justify the statement that freedom of movement serves ‘to recali-
brate questions of justice and democracy in a more appropriate manner’, a 
position that is hardly addressed at all. At best, it suggests that appropriate 
mechanisms do not exist for a constructive democratic dialogue that allows 
for a clear discussion of how we might balance reciprocity between citizen-
ship regimes and reciprocity within them in an equitable and sustainable 
way. So far that has been a matter for the CJEU looking at particular cases, 
on the one hand, and intergovernmental agreements, on the other. Yet both 
seem somewhat ad hoc and insufficiently connected to citizens as a body, 
which perhaps explains the general alienation from the decisions of both 
bodies.4
His third argument restates the first in a neo-Habermasian manner as 
separating ‘nation’ and ‘state’, because EU citizenship ‘lacks the ties to a 
homogenous political ‘community of fate’ that perpetuate significant exclu-
sionary practices’. Again the element of truth in this statement gets lost 
through exaggeration. Floris de Witte suggests that national citizenship 
within the member states ‘is linked to a ‘community of fate’ that reflects 
certain ethno-cultural ideas of a homogenous community’. As I observed 
above, though, what Habermas called ‘constitutional patriotism’ forms the 
norm across the EU. All the member states have citizenship regimes involv-
ing elements of ‘ius soli’ as well as ‘ius sanguinis’ and most have citizenries 
with considerable cultural diversity and mixed blood. Sadly, and worry-
ingly, there are parties of the extreme right everywhere that are motivated by 
‘ethno-cultural ideas of a homogenous community’, and in a very few coun-
tries these parties are in government. But such sentiments are not intrinsic to 
the very idea of a nation state. EU citizenship has no tie to any notion of 
nationality because that is not its function. It exists to facilitate inter- 
nationality and to some degree multi-nationality, but not the demise of any 
sense of nationality whatsoever. As I noted, a sense of political solidarity is 
important for the upholding of rights that we can only possess as members 
4 On the ‘democratic disconnect’ in EU policy making, see Bellamy, R. & 
S. Kröger (2016), ‘The Politicization of European Integration: National 
Parliaments and the Democratic Disconnect’, Comparative European Politics 
14 (2): 125–130.
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of a political community. The role that EU citizenship and free movement 
should play is in heightening our awareness of and respect for such solidar-
ity within all the states of the Union.
 Conclusion
As I said at the beginning, I fully agree with Floris de Witte’s concern at the 
attacks on the EU currently coming from the populist right, a challenge epit-
omized by, but unfortunately not restricted to, the Brexit campaign in the 
UK. However, I doubt that the best way to answer their misleading rhetoric 
is to make rhetorical counter-claims that are the mirror image of theirs. 
Rather, it is to show that their views are largely without foundation and that 
far from undermining national citizenship, EU citizenship and free move-
ment defend it in the context of the normative and empirical challenges of 
an inter-dependent world.
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